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ABSTRACT 
This study uses a stochastic frontier parametrical approach to analyze the inefficiency of firms in the 
water industry between 1999 and 2010. For this purpose, an unbalanced panel of data from 12 firms 
from all over Latin America was used. One of the main findings of the study is that companies from the 
private sector outperform those from the public sector over time. Another conclusion is that there are 
no economies of scale or density, considering the actual size of the average sector. Finally, inefficiency 
shows a positive correlation with the firms’ size and with the length of the network.    
 
  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For several years now, finding a way to measure the performance of firms in the water industry has 
been one of the main concerns of regulatory bodies around the world. This sector has received very 
special attention, not only because of water’s importance in sustaining life, but also because of its 
configuration as a natural monopoly. The most relevant studies about performance have assessed the 
firms’ inefficiency and the way it affects costs, production and, consequently, the customers’ welfare. 
Because of its market structure, the regulation and the incentives mechanism ruling the sector are 
topics of frequent discussion. In particular, the number of privately and publicly-owned entities and the 
degree of regulatory intervention in pricing schemes and quality standards are especially important 
(Worthington 2010). 
 
Besides the ownership nature of the utilities within the sector, some other topics such as reform 
characteristics and implementation, have received considerable interest throughout the literature. 
Regarding this, reform can influence in two ways: one of them is whether or not benefits arise from a 
larger participation of the private sector in the industry by expanding the access and improving 
management within the sector. The second way consists of the incentives scheme designed to increase 
the level of competitiveness. Specifically, whether or not the regulatory framework established is the 
best way to promote cost efficiency, network expansion sustainability and service quality, among all the 
other options available (price caps, rate of return or a hybrid regulation (Lin 2005). Other topics include 
the optimum size of the service area, the volume of production or firm’s size. These are important 
aspects to be considered because they allow verifying if the firms are able to benefit from economies of 
scale or economies of population density. Finally, the usefulness itself of a benchmarking exercise to 
recognize the best practices in various companies that face different regulatory and geographical 
characteristics among countries is also frequently discussed.  
 
In this respect, some recent studies as Sabbioni (2006) and Lin (2005) have made efforts to address the 
sources of these differences in order to make a plausible comparison. These sources are often referred 
to in literature as environmental variables; by ignoring them, non-plausible conclusions may arise. These 
studies introduce them in the analysis to control for heterogeneity factors (i.e. total water 
delivered/firm size, population density, production or distributional technology, resource availability, 
corruption, regional characteristics, etc.). 
 
3 
 
Together, these issues have pushed an increasing number of researches to try to find the best method 
to measure inefficiency. These studies recognize that the efficiency levels rest on variables within firms´ 
control and its value is affected by regulatory and environmental factors surrounding the firms. For this 
purpose, three different types of efficiency were distinguished: scale, allocative and technical. The first 
one presents itself when a firm´s size is optimum for profit maximization. The second one, allocative 
efficiency, refers to a situation where a firm combines inputs in the right shares allowing it to minimize 
production costs. Allocative efficiency is particularly important when firms have to deal with price 
distortions that may restrict their ability to minimize costs. Finally, technical efficiency occurs when a 
firm is producing the maximum possible output with the input combination chosen. This type of 
efficiency might be oriented in two different directions: it may follow an input orientation or an output 
orientation. Basically, this depends on the particular output or input target the firm pursues (Alvarez 
2001). These measures of efficiency have allowed a more detailed and feasible benchmarking exercise 
and improve policy making through the implementation of yardstick regulation forms. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze, using a stochastic frontier approach, the determinants of economic 
inefficiency after the reforms that were implemented in Latin America over the last decades in some 
specific countries. This is to be done by measuring the performance of water utilities that share similar 
characteristics and play a highly essential role within their countries as benchmarks for other smaller or 
less relevant firms in the same sector. Hence, the paper ranks the firms being studied according to the 
impact the new regulation had in their efficiency. In this respect, it is important to note that the 
regulation process carried out has received theoretical disapproval in some of the countries being 
studied. The cases of Peru and Brazil have been studied by Lin (2005) and Da Silva e Souza (2007), 
respectively.  
 
The benchmark system implemented in Peru since 1999, promoted by the World Bank, gave no 
significant improvements in utilities’ performance. This may be explained by the fact that, since the 
scheme lacked variables, some relationships and costs were not taken into account. For this reason, the 
regulatory system in Peru was designed to be output-oriented, ignoring a more appropriate, relative to 
costs, input orientation (Lin 2005). On the other hand, although the participation of the private sector in 
Brazil has increase over the last decade, the larger and main water companies are still publicly owned. 
Since it was implemented in the absence of well-defined regulatory policies, the privatization process 
did not lead to better results. As noted by Tupper and Resende (2004) the tariff policy in Brazil follows a 
rate of return regulation, which might not represent good incentives neither for public or private 
companies. The lack of incentives due to this scheme, compared to price-cap regulation could lead a 
firm to maximize profits without being efficient (Laffont and Tirole 1993). In both cases, the reforms had 
difficulties in their earlier steps which, as the study proves, did not improve significantly over time. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shortly reviews studies estimating efficiency by 
stochastic frontiers for the water distribution companies and provides a brief description of the 
evolution of this procedure over time. Section 3 presents the model specification and the methodology 
that was applied. The data description is provided in Section 4. The estimation results are presented in 
Section 5 and Section 6 shows the study’s conclusions. 
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2. Review of Relevant Studies 
 
The following section provides a short review of the most relevant existing studies that estimate cost 
functions to determine the firms’ level of efficiency and address the presence of economies of scale or 
economies of output/customer density. Both topics are discussed in the present study. Table 1 presents 
a summary of these studies, including the methodology, sample description, functional form and 
variables in the model, as well as the determinants of the supposed inefficiency in each case. 
 
Filippini et al (2008) studies the inefficiency in Slovenian water distribution utilities between 1997 and 
2003. This paper concluded that regulation schemes based on incentives (price caps, revenue caps and 
yardstick regulation) appear to be superior to the traditional rate of return regulation. It also showed by 
testing different model specifications that the different results that were obtained were accounting 
unobservable heterogeneity in the environmental and network characteristics. For this reason, it is 
essential to distinguish between unobserved heterogeneity and inefficiency that influences costs 
(Greene 2005). The study deals with the consistency problem and proposes how the results from 
benchmarking analysis could solve this problem. Regarding the variables, the paper employs total 
annual costs as the dependent variable, total cubic meters of water delivered, labour and capital prices, 
prices of materials and customers as inputs. Heterogeneity controls are also included in the cost 
function: size of area, level of losses, whether or not water is chemically treated, technology changes 
and whether the water is obtained from subterraneous or superfluous sources. One of the findings that 
the traditional random effects models tend to overestimate inefficiency and that the true fixed effects 
model proposed by Greene (2005), although it distinguishes between inefficiency and heterogeneity, 
may slightly underestimate inefficiency since all the time invariant effects are treated as unobserved 
heterogeneity. Despite this fact, the true fixed effects model seems to perform better with respect to 
signs and significances. 
 
On the other hand, Da Silva e Souza et al (2007) discusses the privatization process of over 342 public 
and private enterprises of the water industry in Brazil, during 2002-2004. The study finds that public 
companies are efficient over the period under analysis. However, their efficiency is declining, even 
though the overall efficiency in the sector is improving over time. Souza et al (2005) shows that there is 
no evidence to support that private and public firms are significantly different in terms of their levels of 
efficiency. In addition to the lack of adequate incentives, privatization has occurred in very isolated 
areas and a high percentage of the water coverage and sanitation services are still controlled by the 
government (Basic Sanitation State Companies). The model specification employed used average costs 
as the dependent variable, total volume of water produced as output, inputs such as labour and capital 
price. The inefficiency was considered to be related to population density, percentage of water treated, 
regions and the ownership type. The estimation also shows that both, translog and Cobb Douglas 
functional forms, lead to the same results in terms of effects and signs (these result is not common in 
the literature). The inefficiency components in this study do not differ from those heterogeneity factors 
as noted in the previous study leading to the associated estimations to be biased. 
 
Other authors like Sauer and Frohberg (2007) focus on the problem of size using a sample of rural water 
suppliers in East and West Germany during 2000-2001. The methodology employed is based on a 
demand system with a flexible cost function for input variables; it applies a modified symmetric 
generalized McFadden functional form. This methodology enables the decomposition of the inefficiency 
term into input specific effects (made by using the cost function and the input demand equations 
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through Sheppard’s Lemma, hence avoiding the “Greene problem”1). This study is a response to the 
ongoing debate on the need and feasibility of the liberalization on the water sector in Germany during 
2000. It concludes that the disintegration of utility services seems to be a positive option for an efficient 
restructuring of the sector since no evidence was found to support the claim that vertical integration of 
sewerage and water services reduces costs. The model specification considers operational costs as 
dependent variable, total water production as output; labour, chemicals and energy per m3 as inputs 
and prices of chemicals and energy as input prices. Finally, inefficiency effects seem to be associated 
with firms’ capital (equity), water intake percentage, distribution lines’ net length and number of 
connections. 
 
Similar to our work, Fraquelli and Moiso (2005) used a sample of 18 utilities in ATOs (Optimum Size of 
Territorial Service, an administrative division created by the regulating entity) for 30 years. Following the 
methodology proposed by Battesse and Coelli (1995), a translog cost function was used in an 
unbalanced data setting. The main purpose of the study is to address the optimal size of the firms and 
the impact of economies of scale and to determine whether the tariff planning was efficient. The 
analysis suggests that the disintegration could benefit the overall efficiency in the sector. The model in 
this case employs total delivered water as output; labor, capital and energy costs as inputs; some other 
controls as network length, level of water loss and a time trend that accounts for technological changes. 
Regarding inefficiency, although population density is used, the study argues that other variables would 
perform well (number of large industrial users, level of pumping costs, percentage of water pumped 
from rivers, etc.). 
 
For the Peruvian case, Lin (2005) studies how the introduction of quality variables affects performance 
comparisons across utilities in the water distribution service. For this purpose it compares the 
inefficiency measures obtained from different specifications of stochastic frontier models for a data set 
of Peruvian water utilities during 1996-2001. It also uses Battesse and Coelli (1995) methodology for the 
frontier estimation. As noted by Giannakis et al (2005), cost efficient firms do not necessarily exhibit 
high service quality in the sense that they could reduce costs by reducing the quality of the services 
being provided.. It is also showed that quality improvements lead to positive effects in the sector’s 
productivity. The study concludes then that regulatory evaluations should incorporate quality controls 
instead of using only cost measurements. The model specification employs volume of water billed as 
output; wages, workers as inputs and capital stock; price of capital (annual capital outlays divided by the 
capital stock) as input price and a time trend. Some other controls are added to measure the inefficiency 
level related to the quality of service (positive chlorine tests, service coverage, service continuity, 
difference between water sold and water supplied). 
 
Finally, Aubert and Reynaud (2005) study a panel data set with 211 water utilities observed from 1998 
to 2000. The main finding is that water utilities´ efficiency scores can be partly explained by the 
regulatory framework in place. Consequently comparing regulated utilities in different states and, 
therefore, in different regulators jurisdiction, increases the risk of unobservable characteristics related 
to policy effects biasing the results. It describes the main regulation schemes employed by the sector 
regulators as follows: The rate of return regulation (or cost plus), which was originally thought to reduce 
monopoly effects, does not lead the firm’s incentives to pursue cost efficiency since no price restrictions 
exist. On the other hand, the price cap regulation is a high powered incentive scheme because it induces 
                                                          
1
“The Greene problem” consists on the difficulty of specifying an estimable input system that incorporates both 
technical and allocative inefficiency as well as the satisfactory derivation of the relationship between allocative 
inefficiency in the input demand equations and in the cost function (See e.g. Kumbhakar, 1997). 
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firms to produce efficiently: since the price is set by the regulators, firms can only reduce costs to 
increase their profits. The model specification uses volume of water sold and customers as output; 
energy price and labor price as input prices; capital as input and control variables for technical 
characteristics (Dummy W: utilities that purchase water from another utility, Dummy S: utilities use 
surface water and Depth: Average depth of pumping wells). 
 
These and other relevant studies that use a similar approach (respect to cost functions and the 
stochastic frontier method) are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Summary of Relevant Studies 
 
Author(s) Methodology Sample Specification Ineffiency Determinants
LynK (1993) SFA
10 water 
companies, 
United Kingdom, 
1979-1988.
Dependent: Annual operating costs.
Output: water supply, sewerage service.
Inputs: Labour costs.
Controls: Time trend, regions, private ownership, envirionmental 
services.
None.
Bhattacharyya, Harris, 
Narayanan and Raffiee 
(1995)
SFA
190 public and 31 
private utilities, 
US, 1992
Dependent: Variable costs.
Output: Volume of water.
Input: Energy, labour, materials, stock of capital.
Controls: Water input produced or available for delivery, water 
input source (surface, ground, both), system losses, age of 
distribution pipelines, number of emergency breakdowns, length 
of distribution pipeline, customer type (residential or 
commercial).
Private ownership, Size, 
breakdowns.
Antonioli and Filippini 
(2001)
SFA
32 water 
distribution 
firms, Italy, 1991-
1995.
Dependent: Variable costs. 
Output: Total water distributed.
Input: Price of labour, capital. 
Controls: size (length of pipes), extent (number of customers), 
losses,  chemical treatment, time trend.
None
Estache and Rossi (2002) SFA
50 water 
companies, 29 
Asia-Pacific 
countries, 1995
Dependent: Operational costs.
Output: Number of customers, daily production.
Input: Number of connections.
Controls: Population density in area served, percentage of water 
from surface sources, number of hours of water availability per 
day, percentage of metered connections, qualitative treatment 
variables (chlorination, desalination).
Ownership
Bottasso and Conti 
(2003)
SFA
177 water 
utilities, England 
and Wales, 1995-
2001
Dependent: Operating costs less current cost depreciation and 
infrastructure renewal charge.
Output: Total water delivered.
Input: Capital (repalcement costs of net tangible assets), labour 
costs
Length of mains, average 
pumping head, river 
sources, non-households 
customers, population 
density, water introduced 
in mains as proxy of size.
Aubert and Renaud 
(2005)
SFA
211 water 
utilities, 
Wisconsin, 1998-
2000.
Dependent: Variable costs.
Output: Volume of water sold, customers.
Input: Energy price, labour price, capital (average net base rate of 
water utility).
Controls: Dummy utilities that purchase water from another 
utility, dummy utilities use surface water, average depth of 
pumping wells.
Dummy for each regulatory 
regime, time trend.
Lin (2005) SFA
Water 
distribution 
companies, 
Peru, 1996-2001.
Dependent: Total costs.
Output: Volume of water billed, 
Inputs: Wages, number of employees per 1000 conn., price of 
capital, capital stock. 
Quality service: positive 
chlorine tests, service 
coverage, service 
continuity, difference 
between water sold and 
water supplied), time 
trend.
Fraquelli and Moiso 
(2005)
SFA
18 ATOs 
(regional 
territories), 
Italy, 1975-2005
Dependent: Total costs.
Output: Total delivered water.
Input: labour, capital, energy costs.
Controls: Network length, level of losses, time trend.
Number of residents to 
network length.
Kirkpatrick, Parker and 
Zhang (2006)
SFA and DEA
110 water 
utilities, Africa, 
2000.
Dependent: Operating and maintenance expenditure.
Output: Water delivered. 
Input: Labour price, material price of water distributed. 
Controls: number of water treatment works. 
Ownership.
Sabbioni (2006) SFA
280 water 
utilities, Brazil, 
2002.
Dependent: Totol costs.
Output: Volume of water produce, population served, number 
connections.
Input: Wages.
Water purchased from 
another company, 
household consumption, 
regions.
Da silva e Souza, Faria 
and Moreira (2007)
SFA
324 public and 18 
enterprises, 
Brazil, 2002-
2004. 
Dependent: Average costs.
Output: Volume of water produced.
Input: Price of capital, price of labour.
Population density, water 
treated, dummy for 
regions, state/private.
Sauer and Frohberg 
(2007)
SFA
Rural water 
suppliers, East 
and West 
Germany, 2000-
2001.
Dependent: Operational costs.
Output: Water output.
Input: labour, energy, chemicals, wages, price of energy, price of 
chemicals.
Level of capital (equity), 
water intake percentage, 
net length, number of 
connections.
Filippini, Hrovatin and 
Zoric (2008)
SFA
52 water 
utilities, 
Slovenia, 1997-
2003.
Dependent: Total annual cost.
Output: Total water delivered, network size.
Input: Labour, capital, materials. 
Controls: time trend.
Level of losses, water 
chemically treated before 
distribution, 
subterraneous water 
sources, superflous water. 
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3. Methodology and Model Specification  
 
Methodology 
 
The present study attempts to identify the determinants of the inefficiency within the water sector for 
Latin America by a one-step procedure. For this purpose, a cost function frontier was modeled where 
firms faced a minimization problem. Following this method, the level of inefficiency was obtained as the 
residual component (different from the error term and different from heterogeneity factors as 
discussed in the literature). At the same time, this residual was modeled to find the determinants of 
inefficiency in the water distribution sector in Latin America. Investigations that follow the frontier 
approach are particularly accurate because, unlike other methods2, they do not assume that all firms 
are efficient (Coelli, et al. 1998). These studies try to estimate a frontier from the best practices 
observed. 
 
Some aspects of the estimation technique require special attention3. As is presented by Söderberg 
(2007), it can be noted that Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), the parametric approach, rests on two 
basic assumptions:  that utilities have a common underlying cost function and that the inefficiency term 
can be approximated through a pre-specified distribution (in addition to the standard random noise and 
considering time variations in this term). This way, the inefficiency term can be separated from the data 
noise and the parametric tests can be carried out. On the other hand, stochastic frontier models are 
exposed to three potential problems (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984). First of all, estimations of the 
inefficiency, though unbiased, are inconsistent (variance never approaches to cero as the sample 
grows). Second, it is necessary to assume some distributional form in order to estimate the model and 
separate the inefficiency term from the error. Finally, it may not be accurate to suppose that some 
regressors are independent from the inefficiency term because if a firm knows its level of inefficiency, it 
could alter its choice of inputs. 
 
Data envelopment Analysis (DEA), the non-parametric approach, constructs its frontier from the best-
practice operation assuming that data is noise free. Despite more giving the analysis more flexibility, 
DEA is very sensitive to the number of included inputs and outputs (Bonifaz and Rodriguez, 2001), the 
input and output variables selected and data errors that could distort the outcome (Irastorza, 2003). For 
example if the number of observations grew, the method would lose the ability to differentiate between 
efficient and inefficient firms. One important problem with DEA is that it does not assume a distribution 
for the error term. Thus, estimations will not have statistical properties and hypotheses testing are 
impossible to implement. Furthermore the results can be very sensitive to the number of observations, 
variables or the presence of outlier, which might bias the efficiency estimates (Yunos and Hawdon, 
1997). 
 
Since being able to carry out hypothesis tests on our results is crucial, and the fact that some variables 
are measured differently by each enterprise cannot be ruled out (which would make the outcomes 
biased), the SFA approach was chosen in order to carry out this study. Moreover, recent studies have 
increased the attractiveness of benchmarks based on stochastic frontiers (Söderberg, 2007). 
 
Inefficiency measurements based on Stochastic Frontier Analysis have evolved over the time. They were 
originally proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). 
                                                          
2
Productivity indexes, production functions, etc. 
3
For estimating a frontier both, parametric and non-parametric approaches can be used. 
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These authors consider that deviations from the frontier are explained by inefficiency but are also 
related to other variables. Later, Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) introduced the 
analysis to panel data. Some other studies tried to explain inefficiency as a function of specific 
determinants with a two-step approach. The difficulty in this method is that it has a consistency problem 
with the a priori assumptions about the error term. Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Huang and Liu (1994) and 
Battesse and Coelli (1995) proposed a one-step approach to model the inefficiency simultaneously 
distinguishing two components in the error, one of them is associated with a pre-truncated distribution 
and estimated as a function of exogenous variables related to the firm’s inefficiency. Reifschneider and 
Stevenson (1991), Caudill and Ford (1993), Caudill et al. (1995), and Hadri (1999) modeled these 
exogenous variables not in the inefficiency error mean but in its variance. 
 
In the present paper, we estimate a stochastic cost frontier model by using the True Fixed Effects Model 
first proposed by Greene (2005). The True Fixed Effects Model separates all time-invariant sources of 
heterogeneity from the inefficiency term and hence distinguishes them from other random factors 
affecting firms’ costs minimization. This model tries to solve the limitations of the basic Fixed Effects and 
Random Effects models by simply introducing dummy variables for each firm and allowing the 
inefficiency component to vary over time, defined as a random variable that depends on random 
factors. As the basic Fixed Effects Model, if time-invariant regressors are included in the model 
specification the model will lead to the estimation of biased parameters. Even if this point is overcome, 
the model will capture all unobserved time-invariant components of inefficiency within the firm specific 
constant term (the dummy variable) which may lead to the underestimation of the inefficiency levels. 
 
In addition, the applied methodology will also depend on the frontier specification, which might employ 
a production function (which shows the quantities produced according to the inputs used) or a cost 
function (which reflects the total cost as a function of the product and input prices). For the purpose of 
this paper, we have chosen a cost function specification because, in the water distribution sector (same 
as transport, electricity and other public services); supply must match demand levels permanently. 
Following the previous idea, as mentioned by Kumbhakar (1991), since cost functions summarize all the 
economically relevant aspects of technology, it is common to use models based on costs instead of 
production functions. The choice of either of them depends on the behavioral assumptions of the 
producers and availability of data. The cost specification is often used in regulated sectors where firms’ 
outputs are assumed to be exogenous, the same as input prices. Since production is out of firms’ control 
it is reasonable to assume they minimize costs adjusting their inputs usage.  
 
These and other aspects have to be considered in the above election. Sabbioni (2006) organizes them in 
five points: 1) Operating environment (related with the institutional framework; if the firm is required to 
produce at a specific level, the production function will not be appropriate), 2) Endogeneity of input 
quantities, 3) Data limitations (physical quantities vs. prices), 4) Output definition (using a production 
function, one has to choose among various proxies that might be included as regressors in a cost 
function), 5)Technology and quality specification are often difficult to include in production functions.  
According to all these factors it is more appropriate to estimate a cost function in this case. 
 
As mentioned before, inefficiency measures are associated with different sources in the production 
process. Since we estimate a cost function frontier, the inefficiency measures are related to both, 
technical and allocative inefficiency; following to Battesse and Coelli (1995), we impose allocative 
efficiency over time even though it might be a strong assumption. In this respect, we consider all the 
firms included in the sample as efficiency benchmarks for their countries or regions. Hence, inefficiency 
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must be better explained by technical and firm’s specific factors than by particular input price 
distortions. 
 
Theoretical Model 
 
Since in the water sector the output is assumed to be given for the firms, we estimate a cost function4 
frontier model. The function estimated is the solution to the minimization problem: 
           
    
    subject to        
     . The     term represents the nature of the technical 
inefficiency effects over the production function. As noted, a positive value of this term will increase the 
firm’s need of inputs for a predefined level of output. This procedure will result in the following form: 
 
    ∑         
 
 
 
In terms of the methodology applied here, this general expression is rewritten for the frontier 
estimation in the panel data context. Then we have: 
 
                         
 
Where     denotes costs at the      observation              for the     firm           . This 
expression is for the case in which the variables have been stated in logarithms where the   constant is 
used to control for firm heterogeneity fixed effects (different from the inefficiency component),     is a 
                                                       5  vector of values of known 
functions of inputs, outputs and other explanatory variables associated with the      firm at the      
period and   is a      vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. 
 
The error term here has two components,     , that represents a white noise and is assumed to be an iid 
      
   , independently distributed of the inefficiency term   , which isa non-negative random 
variable. Here we assume that the    term is distributed as a truncated normal (to impose non-negative 
values) with mean      and variance   
 .Following Huang and Liu (1994) and Battesse and Coelli (1995), 
we modeled the inefficiency term mean as a function of other factors under firm’s control. Thus     is a 
     vector of explanatory variables associated with inefficiency of firms over time and   is a       
vector of unknown parameters estimated by the model. 
 
Since the underlying production technology is unknown we employ a more flexible functional form for 
any quadratic approximation of the real function without imposing any restrictions over elasticities 
(Chambers 1988).Not imposing restrictions over production technology will allow the analysis to 
measure the level of economies of scale and economies of production density. In the literature, the 
translog function is one of the most adopted functional forms in the cost frontier context for its 
flexibility6; however as pointed by Conrad and Jorgensen (1997) most empirical studies fail to satisfy the 
appropriate curvature conditions for the whole range of observations. The translog function must satisfy 
some regularity conditions according to the cost theory: it must be linearly homogeneous in factor 
prices, non-decreasing in factor prices and output, symmetric and concave. Some of these conditions 
                                                          
4
Some other reasons have been exposed previously for this election. 
5
These variables are related to environmental and geographical characteristics.  
6
Although it is more flexible than the more simple Cobb-Douglas functional form, is very common to suffer 
multicolinearity problems when using translog functions. 
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might be implemented either by normalizing costs and inputs prices to one of them or by assuming that 
cross-products related to prices have non-marginal effects.   
 
Econometric Specification 
 
According to the former discussion we restate the previous expressions for a translog functional form, 
thus the model estimated for the i – th firm and the t – th period is as follows:  
 
                          
       
 
 
             
 
 
     
               
 
   
                  
 
Where       represents costs expressed in logarithms,    accounts for unobserved time-invariant firm 
specific heterogeneity effects,        is the logarithm of the output variable,       is the vector of j 
inputs in logarithms, and       is a vector of k exogenous variables that control other environmental and 
technological factors out of firms’ control. Finally,     and      represent, as mentioned before, the error 
term of the model. We have assumed that matrixes A and C are symmetric since it cannot be imposed in 
the estimation procedure applied here. Additionally, we have not considered second differentiable 
effects for the k exogenous variables because they are not related to the original cost minimization 
problem and, therefore, are not involved functionally in the production technology. Linear homogeneity 
is imposed by assuming all parameters related to cross-products and squared terms of prices to be cero. 
This condition can also be attained by normalizing costs and other input prices to one input price. 
 
For the cost variable (COST) we used the operational costs of firms excluding salaries and depreciation 
related to administrative expenditures. The variable output (CONN) has been approximated by the 
number of connections of potable water in the service area. The number of connections must have a 
positive effect on the costs. The actual production (in liters per day) is taken within a density ratio 
against the population size of the service area: a lower ratio will indicate a densely populated area of 
distribution and, consequently, less infrastructure expenditures for firms, then is expected to have a 
negative impact over operation costs7; this ratio (DENSITY) and a time trend (TREND) are included as 
exogenous variables affecting the production technology accounting for environmental characteristics 
and technical change over time, respectively. For input variables we considered the number of full time 
employees (EMPL) and the total km. of water network length (LEN). We use the Gross Domestic Product 
per capita (GDP) as a proxy of salaries or labour price; we did not have information available for capital 
prices/costs for each firm as used by other studies. In the literature, it is a common practice to employ 
capital expenditures divided by water production (or other output variable). Unfortunately that 
information  is often not available or is highly inaccurate. 
 
As explained above, the inefficiency term has two components:  
 
    is a random error assumed to be i.i.d.      
   and independent from    . The     term is a non-
negative random error obtained from truncating a normal distribution with a mean that can be 
expressed as a function of some other random variables. This term indicates the deviation degree, 
                                                          
7
 Other density ratios have been used through literature. Franquelli and Moiso (2005) used a density variable 
obtained by dividing number of customer by the network length. Da Silva e Souza et al (2007) and Estache and 
Rossi (2002) both use population density for this purpose. 
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presumably due to inefficiency, for each observation. Following Battesse and Coelli (1995) approach for 
panel data which extended the model of Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGukin (1991) and Reifschneider and 
Stevenson (1991), inefficiency effects are defined by firm-specific variables. Thus we have: 
 
               
 
Here      is the mean of the inefficiency term. Notice that it varies over time depending on those firm 
specific factors, which is different from the more traditional methods that assume the inefficiency term 
or its mean to be constant in each period. Several studies have argued about the possible variables 
determining inefficiency, even though, a consensus has not been reached.. In the present paper we 
proposed the next expression to model inefficiency considering that it should be affected only by 
variables under firms’ control and not by environmental effects (that influenced costs directly) as other 
studies have shown. Hence, the inefficiency term is specified as:  
 
                                                                 
 
 
Where OWNERSHIP is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the firm is private and cero 
otherwise (in particular, the variable takes a cero value when the firm is public). This variable is 
expected to reduce cost inefficiency since private firms might have better management practices and a 
more effective incentives scheme. WCOV and SCOV are the percentage level of water and sewerage 
coverage, respectively; a higher coverage will lead to economies of scale (if they are present), therefore 
increasing the input usage efficiency. TREAT is the percentage level of wastewater that received at least 
primary treatment after collection; if wastewater were to receive treatment, it would prevent water 
sources from being corrupt and hence reduce treatment expenses before distribution, which might 
increase efficiency. LOSSES accounts for the percentage level of non-revenue water; a higher level of 
losses would indicate bigger outlays from illegal connections or a greater waste from leakage due to 
infrastructure problems. This effect should increase water needs from final customers leading the firm 
to increase water production. METER represents the metering level percentage; a higher metering level 
will have a positive effect in reducing losses from administrative issues (then this variable might suffer 
from multicolinearity problems with LOSSES). Finally     is a random variable accounting for stochastic 
effects on inefficiency. Then the cost inefficiency for the i – th firm and for the t – th period is measure 
by: 
 
                                          
 
The inefficiency measure for each firm is then a non-negative random variable which depends on other 
explanatory factors that control effects for firm-specific characteristics. It can be observed that the 
inefficiency mean will vary over time, having independent but not identical distributions for each firm at 
a specific time. 
 
For the estimation procedure applied we have considered an unbalanced panel data of Latin American 
water distribution companies for the period 1999-2010. Of these, 9 were public and the other 3 firms 
were considered private8. The panel structure is shown in Appendix 1. All the information employed in 
                                                          
8
Public companies: CAGESE (Ceara), COMPESA (Pernambuco), EMBASA (Bahia), CEDAE (Rio de Janeiro), CASAN 
(Santa Catarina), CORSAN (Rio Grande do Sul), SANEAGO (Goiania) from Brazil, SEDAPAL from Peru and EAAB from 
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this study was taken from the data base of the corresponding regulatory authority9  each country and 
from the World Bank water benchmarking network data (IBNET)10. Table 2 shows the average of each 
relevant variable by firm for the available period analyzed in each case.  A summary and the statistical 
description of each variable are presented in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 2: Average of Relevant Variables by Firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary and Statistical Description of Variables 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Colombia. Private companies: AGUAS ANDINAS from, Chile; AGUAS ARGENTINAS/AySA (until 2003) from Argentina 
and OSE from Uruguay (from 2006 is a public-private). 
9
SUNASS for Peru, SNISS for Brazil, SISS for Chile, SUI for Colombia, ERAS for Argentina and URSEA/OSE for 
Uruguay. 
10
International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities. http://www.ib-net.org/. 
SEDAPAL 194,732,228    1,259,551     2,062       10,123           2,821     282                 88.1% 83.7% 9.0% 39.9% 65.6%
AGUAS ANDINAS 154,973,432    1,388,563     1,167       10,946           7,008     207                 100.0% 98.2% 54.0% 29.0% 94.9%
AGUAS ARGENTINAS 201,098,414    1,549,736     2,925       16,256           5,762     576                 82.4% 62.1% 10.4% 35.4% 24.5%
E.A.A.B. 170,700,553    1,574,768     1,679       8,446             4,122     184                 99.8% 97.5% 0.0% 36.7% 97.7%
O.S.E. 125,776,412    776,524        4,508       12,287           6,234     276                 94.1% 31.6% 70.2% 52.8% 96.8%
CAGESE / CE 225,783,255    1,194,739     1,256       8,440             4,604     199                 81.2% 53.0% 100.0% 33.4% 93.9%
COMPESA / PE 444,891,381    1,413,258     3,381       10,267           4,604     230                 86.1% 60.5% 87.0% 56.8% 64.1%
EMBASA / BA 516,110,007    2,090,788     3,523       19,529           4,604     198                 91.2% 26.5% 24.7% 34.7% 87.2%
CEDAE / RJ 2,081,165,497 1,821,905     7,512       16,315           4,604     500                 85.7% 67.3% 72.0% 52.4% 62.5%
CASAN / SC 217,933,925    806,196        2,352       13,134           4,604     250                 85.4% 54.3% 96.4% 40.1% 91.2%
CORSAN / RS 552,388,173    1,568,383     4,412       22,158           4,604     243                 91.6% 49.9% 78.5% 42.3% 66.7%
SEANEAGO /GO 286,276,090    1,076,217     3,493       17,343           4,604     190                 88.6% 55.3% 52.6% 35.4% 96.5%
General Average 432,706,783    1,374,574     3,190       13,843           4,914     278                 89.5% 61.5% 64.3% 40.6% 78.5%
GDP per 
Cápita 
(US$)
Production per 
Cápita 
(l/person/day)
Water 
Coverage 
(%)
Sewerage 
Coverage 
(%)
Wastewater 
Treated (%)
Metering 
Level (%)
Non-revenue 
Water (%)
Firm
Number of 
Connections
Operational 
Costs (US$)
Number of 
Employees
Distribution 
Network of 
Water (Km) 
Variables Description Average Standard Deviation Maximun Minimun Expected Sign
COST Operational Costs (US$) 432,706,783          593,069,651               4,466,905,410          79,910,000          
Output
CONN Number of Connections 1,374,574               412,912                       2,513,663                   675,217                (+)
Inputs
EMPL Number of Employees 3,190                       1,754                            8,416                           1,006                     (+)
LEN Distribution Network of Water (Km) 13,843                     4,459                            23,924                         6,675                     (+)
Input Prices
GDP GDP per Cápita (US$) 4,914                       2,118                            10,167                         2,044                     (+)
Controls
DENS Production per Cápita (l/person/day) 278                           125                                622                               179                        (-)
TIME Time Trend  -  - 12 1 (-)
Inefficiency
OWNERSHIP Ownership Type (Private or Public)  -  - 1 0 (-)
WCOV Water Coverage (%) 89.54% 9.34% 100.00% 62.00% (-)
SCOV Sewerage Coverage (%) 61.50% 33.10% 100.00% 8.00% (-)
TREAT Wastewater Treated (%) 64.26% 42.23% 100.00% 0.00% (-)
LOSSES Non-revenue Water (%) 40.63% 9.90% 66.00% 23.00% (+)
METER Metering Level (%) 78.54% 21.74% 100.00% 23.61% (-)
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4. Results and Estimates  
 
The cost frontier is estimated by using the Maximum Likelihood algorithm. This allowed the parameters 
of both the stochastic frontier and the mean of inefficiency term to be estimated simultaneously11. 
Table 4 shows the results.  
 
 
Table 4: Cost Frontier and Inefficiency Model Estimates 
 
 
Since all the variables were expressed in logarithms (except for dummies, percentages and the time 
trend), the coefficients derived from the model represent cost elasticities evaluated at an average point. 
The overall coefficient estimates obtained for the cost frontier were as expected: results proved that the 
number of connections has a positive effect on operational costs. In other words, an increase in the 
number of connections will push costs to a higher level. The coefficients for all the inputs and input 
prices were significant and had the expected sign. In both cases, the expected coefficients were used as 
control variables. On the other hand, the higher the density ratio, the lower the operational cost, as it 
becomes less expensive for firms to supply water and sewerage services for with a higher number of 
people by reducing the infrastructure extent and maintenance costs. However, the test showed that the 
density variable was not statistically significant enough. The time trend had a negative and significant 
effect, which could be interpreted as real cost reduction due to technical change over time.   
 
Second order parameters were estimated but did not show significance for all the effects. The second 
order coefficient for the production variable was significant and negative, showing that its effect, though 
positive, is marginally decreasing. Another  interesting cross-effect was  found the production’s effect on 
costs depended significantly on the number of employees, namely, the higher the number of 
employees, the greater the effect of production scales on costs. Also, the cross-effect of the network  
                                                          
11
The model is estimated by using Frontier 4.1 program (developed by Tim Coelli). 
www.uq.edu.au/economics/cepa/software.htm. 
Variables Coeficient Standar Error Probability Variables Coeficient Standar Error Probability
Constant -218.8178 0.9967 0.0000 Constant 0.0575 0.6279 0.9272
D1 0.1579 0.1268 0.2159 OWNERSHIP -0.9895 0.2111 0.0000
D2 -1.1988 0.1144 0.0000 WCOV -0.9389 0.3989 0.0206
D3 -0.5179 0.2742 0.0619 SCOV 0.0963 0.1261 0.4468
D4 -0.0158 0.1420 0.9117 TREAT 0.2171 0.1229 0.0803
D8 0.5773 0.2358 0.0161 LOSSES 2.5138 0.5358 0.0000
D9 2.2124 0.2792 0.0000 METER -0.2956 0.4405 0.5038
D11 0.9419 0.1960 0.0000
D12 0.3859 0.1566 0.0155 Variance Estimates Coeficient Standar Error Probability
CONN 20.2405 0.6858 0.0000 sigma-squared 0.0469 0.0122 0.0002
EMPL 6.6489 0.9616 0.0000 gamma 0.6234 0.1212 0.0000
LEN 12.4665 1.0362 0.0000
CONN^2 -1.0021 0.2344 0.0000 Number of Firms 12
EMPL^2 0.1717 0.1698 0.3145 Number of Periods 12
LEN^2 -0.0987 0.5972 0.8691 Total Observations 119
CONN*EMPL 0.6135 0.1878 0.0015
CONN*LEN 0.3858 0.7158 0.5911
EMPL*LEN -1.9728 0.4290 0.0000
GDP 0.8957 0.0780 0.0000
DENS -0.0281 0.2782 0.9199
TREND -0.0234 0.0120 0.0535
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length and number of employees was negative, which may suggest that a degree of complementarity 
between in the inputs selection. From this, we can infer that an input will depend negatively on the 
other input’s level. From this finding, an optimal cost level might be reached by increasing both the 
number of employees and the network size.  
 
For the inefficiency term, the majority of explanatory variables were significant. The first remark 
regarding inefficiency is about the constant term. Although it resulted not to be significant, it cannot be 
affirmed that none of the time invariant sources of inefficiency where found because the firm 
identification dummies included were expected to absorb all constant heterogeneity factors (including 
those affecting inefficiency). As it can be noted from Table 4 most of the dummy variables were 
significant12, hence an overestimation of these coefficients is possible due to model specification. As 
noted in Greene (2005) there is not a perfect way to avoid overestimation or underestimation of the 
inefficiency component through model specification because both, the inefficiency and the 
heterogeneity have time-invariant effects. Second, the ownership variable accounting for differences on 
inefficiency scores between public and private firms resulted significant. The better private management 
hypothesis is confirmed for the case studied here; this might be due to the lagged effects of reform over 
the sector in Latin American countries during the last decade.  
 
Third, the water coverage coefficient was negative and significant which is interpreted as evidence for 
the existence of economies of scale in the firms’ service areas. Due to the high density of the areas 
served by the sample firms, a coverage expansion might take advantage of this fact leading to a 
reduction in the cost per unit. The sewerage coverage coefficient was found not to be significant. 
However, this variable had a positive coefficient, which might call for an unsuccessful vertical integration 
of these two activities within firms. An interesting finding from the inefficiency model was that the 
variable treatment (accounting for wastewater treated percentage) presented a positive effect on 
inefficiency measures. This might be a significant indicator of the previous idea concerning vertical 
integration of water supply and sewerage services. Variable losses, as expected, had a positive sign, and 
then it will lead to increase inefficiency by rising water production from its optimal volume to supply a 
given demand. Its positive sign is explained not only by physical losses due to inadequate pipeline 
maintenance but also by poor management and billing policies (this incentives illegal connections 
increasing inefficiency levels). Finally, the metering level had a negative effect on inefficiency but 
resulted not to be significant.  
 
 
  
                                                          
12
 For estimation purposes we excluded 4 dummy variables from the model specification in order to avoid severe 
multicolinearity problems. 
16 
 
 
To validate the use of a translog cost function and the model specification, we tested alternative 
specifications with different hypothesis. The contrasts are made by comparing the generalized likelihood 
ratio resulting from the unrestricted and restricted versions with a critical value. The critical values 
employed correspond to the tables presented in Kodde and Palm (1986)13. The results are shown below. 
 
Table 5: Critical values 
Null Hypothesis Restrictions Likelihood Function LR Test Critical Value* 
                6 31.43 23.02 11.91 
                 6 13.80 58.27 11.91 
             7 13.28 59.32 13.401 
         8 -34.69 155.25 14.853 
 
 
The first hypothesis consists in comparing the Cobb-Douglas specification against the more flexible 
translog functional form. The result obtained was the rejection of the hypothesis that the Cobb-Douglas 
specification has a similar fit in terms of the Likelihood function. The second test resulted in the 
rejection of the hypothesis that assumed the inefficiency term was not a function of the explanatory 
variables proposed by the study. The third hypothesis posed that inefficiency had a half normal 
distribution as opposed to a truncated normal. However, the test showed evidence to reject this 
assumption. Finally, the last test was made to justify the time-invariant heterogeneity difference among 
firms, but the hypothesis of non-existence of these effects was also rejected. An additional test may be 
noticed from the estimation table: the variance parameter gamma was found significant indicating that 
inefficiency is a stochastic variable and that deviation from the estimated frontier is due to other factors 
besides random errors. 
 
The average inefficiency score considering all firms for the whole available period is 1.32 which indicates 
that in average Latin American companies in the water sector experienced an increase in costs of 32% 
due to inefficiency.. The inefficiency ranking obtained from the estimation is presented graphically in 
Figure 1. It can be observed that the most efficient company is AGUAS ANDINAS from Chile, followed by 
AGUAS ARGENTINAS14, and in third place, OSE (OBRAS SANITARIAS DEL ESTADO) from Uruguay. On the 
other hand, the company presenting the most inefficiency is COMPESA from Brazil. Both AGUAS 
ARGENTINAS and AGUAS ANDINAS are privately owned, while COMPESA and CEDAE (second to last 
regarding efficiency) are publicly owned. This result is coherent with the estimation described above and 
might indicate that the privatization process over the last two decades in some countries in the sample 
had real efficiency improvements or, at least, that private companies outperform state companies 
throughout the period under analysis. Figure 2, where the average inefficiency score (by category) of all 
firms classified as public over time are shown.  
  
                                                          
13
 According Coelli, Prasada and Battese (1998) the number of degrees of freedom used for choosing the critical 
value equals the number of constraints posed by the null hypothesis. 
14
The name of this company was changed to AGUAS Y SANEAMIENTO ARGENTINO in 2006. 
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Figure 1: Inefficiency Rankings by Average Inefficiency by Firm 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Inefficiency of Public and Private Sector over Time 
 
 
 
Another important finding derived from the inefficiency measures is the overall time evolution of the 
average score. Figure 3 shows this aspect clearly. As is evident, the inefficiency is decreasing over time, 
which might indicate a progressive improvement for the sector through all the studied firms in Latin 
America. Decomposition of this evolution by firms can be found in Appendix 2. 
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Figure 3: Inefficiency Evolution over Time 
 
 
 
 
After analyzing the firms’ inefficiency component in costs, the second purpose of this study is to verify 
the existence of economies of scale and economies of output density. Economies of scale reflect the 
degree in which costs increase due to an increment in output, keeping all other variables constant. 
However, as noticed in Fraquelli and Moiso (2005) the output may change with the output 
characteristics (partly represented by inputs). By including the network length in the cost frontier 
estimation we allow for the distinction of economies of output density and economies of scale (Filippini 
2001). Here we followed Fraquelli and Moiso (2005) by measuring economies of output density as the 
inverse of output cost elasticity and economies of scale as the inverse of the sum of the elasticity with 
respect to outputs and the network length. If these measurements are higher than one, it would 
indicate the presence of economies and therefore cost savings from increases in either outputs or 
network length.  
 
Then the economies of scale and output density measures for the model estimated here are 0.049 and 
0.031, respectively. These scores suggest that, at the current size, the water distribution companies 
studied are, on average,  unable to take advantage of cost savings by increasing output or the network 
coverage. 
 
Another important finding related to scale effects might be seen graphically in Figure 4 and Figure 5, 
where firms are presented in ascendant order according to their number of connections and network 
length. Firms’ inefficiency seems to increase with size (measured either by connections or network 
length). This result could be related to the fact that there was no evidence of economies and hence 
costs increase more than proportionally when the number of connections or network size grow,  
presumably because of efficiency losses. This is an indicator then that firms operate at a critical size that 
do not contribute to efficiency improvements. 
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Figure 4: Inefficiency by number of Connections (Firms ordered ascending) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Inefficiency by Network Length (Firms ordered ascending) 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The main findings of this study concern the level of inefficiency among firms and whether or not 
economies of scale exist in the water distribution sector for Latin America within the sample analyzed. 
First, inefficiency scores showed, on average, a declining trend over time. However, this conclusion has 
to be carefully applied for specific categories within the whole group. For private companies the 
inefficiency measures were more stable than those for public units; scores for public sector exhibited a 
more unstable evolution, even though these findings may reflect the presence of distorted 
observations.. The overall inefficiency for private companies was significantly lower than that for their 
public pares. This can be interpreted as the consequence of a successful reform and the privatization 
process over the last decades in some specific countries. Even though the sample used was not 
significantly large, the results are representative enough to be generalized for other water industries 
among Latin America. 
 
Regarding economies of scale and output density, the analysis derived from the estimation proved the 
absence of potential cost savings by increasing the firms’ size or network length. At the current size, the 
overall water sector is not likely to be efficient due to administrative negative effects. This finding might 
be also related with some evidence from the estimation suggesting that a successful vertical integration 
of water supply and sewerage services has not yet been achieved. The inefficiency scores showed a 
positive correlation with size measures, the higher the output and network size, the greater the 
inefficiency levels. Potential gains could be obtained by reducing the firms’ size, especially for those in 
the public sector.  
 
Finally, the methodology applied allows a more accurate benchmarking exercise, considering 
environmental and output characteristics differences and isolates inefficiency effects by including firm 
idiosyncratic factors in this term. Hence an appropriate distinction between heterogeneity sources and 
inefficiency associated variables is done, which might be a useful tool in order to implement a better 
yardstick indicator for regulatory purposes. Since this analysis was made for a mixed sample including 
companies from different countries, a practical application of the results found is hardly possible 
However, it might allow to recognize best practices from the sample studied and the implementation of 
a sort of competition by comparison with a more informed customer.  
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Appendixes  
 
Appendix 1: Panel Structure (Observations Available) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Firms’ Inefficiency Evolution over Time 
 
 
 
 
Observations 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL
SEDAPAL 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 9
AGUAS ANDINAS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
AGUAS ARGENTINAS 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 10
E.A.A.B. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
O.S.E. 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 10
CAGESE / CE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 10
COMPESA / PE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 10
EMBASA / BA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 10
CEDAE / RJ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 10
CASAN / SC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 10
CORSAN / RS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 10
SEANEAGO /GO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 10
TOTAL 8 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 4 2 119
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